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NOTES
Civil Procedure--New Rules for an Old Game: North Carolina
Compulsory Counterclaim Provision Applies in Divorce Suits
Piecemeal litigation has been a prevalent feature in divorce ac-
tions. Adverse parties filing similar claims in separate counties, racing
to judgment in hopes of barring the other's claim, is a common pattern
in marital disputes.1 Traditionally, the doctrine of abatement, which
requires that an action initiated during the pendency of a prior action
be dismissed if the two are sufficiently similar, provided a way to dis-
pose of unnecessary litigation. In divorce actions, however, the doc-
trine has been narrowly applied.' In contrast, employment of a
compulsory counterclaim theory could prevent unnecessary litigation
in circumstances in which strict application of abatement would not.
Thus, it was anticipated that the adoption of a compulsory counter-
claim rule as part of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure3
could alter the procedures once followed in divorce suits.4 In Gardner
v. Gardner,5 the North Carolina Supreme Court made this change clear
by holding that counterclaims for divorce, with one narrow exception,
are compulsory counterclaims within the meaning of rule 13(a).6
In Gardner, a wife sued for alimony and divbrce on the ground
that her husband had abandoned her when he moved out of the marital
home.7 Shortly before the husband was required to answer, his own
1. See, e.g., Fullwood v. Fullwood, 270 N.C. 421, 154 S.E.2d 473 (1967); Beeson v. Beeson,
246 N.C. 330, 98 S.E.2d 17 (1957); Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796 (1952); Cook
v. Cook, 159 N.C. 46, 74 S.E. 639 (1912); McLeod v. McLeod, 1 N.C. App. 396, 161 S.E.2d 635
(1968).
2. E.g., Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796 (1952).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-I (1969).
4. See McCarley v. McCarley, 289 N.C. 109, 114, 221 S.E.2d 490, 494 (1976) (dictum); 2 R.
LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW §144 (3d ed. Supp. 1976) (author suggests new rules of civil
procedure may alter prior case law).
5. 294 N.C. 172, 240 S.E.2d 399 (1978).
6. Id. at 181, 240 S.E.2d at 406. N.C.R. Civ. P. 13(a) provides:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire juris-
diction. But the pleader need not state the claim if
(1) At the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another
pending action, or
(2) The opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other process
by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment
on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this rule.
7. 294 N.C. at 174, 240 S.E.2d at 401; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2(4), -7(l) (1976). The
wife prayed initially for alimony without divorce. She later amended her complaint to state a
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claim for absolute divorce based on the one-year statutory separation
period' accrued.9 While his wife's action was pending, the husband
filed his divorce claim in another county.'0 The wife, relying on both
abatement and compulsory counterclaim theories, moved that her hus-
band's action be dismissed or stayed until her own action could be de-
termined."I The court denied her motions,' 2 and the court of appeals
denied her writ of certiorari.'
3
On appeal,' 4 the North Carolina Supreme Court decided for the
wife.' 5 The court held, based on the compulsory counterclaim rule, 6
that the husband's claim for divorce was a compulsory counterclaim in
the wife's suit.' 7 The governing rule, 13(a), makes counterclaims aris-
ing out of the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim
claim for alimony and divorce from bed and board, a judicial separation of husband and wife that
can be nullified by resumption of marital relations. 294 N.C. at 174, 240 S.E.2d at 401.
8. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (Supp. 1977).
9. See 294 N.C. at 174, 240 S.E.2d at 401-02. N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1) provides in part: "A
defendant shall serve his answer within 30 days after service of the summons and complaint upon
him." The summons and complaint in the wife's action were served on the husband on May 17,
1976. His claim accrued on May 28, 1976, one year after he had left home. Brief for Appellant at
2.
10. 294 N.C. at 174, 240 S.E.2d at 402. The wife filed her claim in Wayne County one day
after she moved there from the Johnston County residence she and her husband had maintained
for many years. Before filing his independent action, the husband moved to transfer the wife's
action to Johnston County, where he still lived, on the basis of improper venue. The motion was
denied. While appeal of the motion was pending, the husband moved to transfer the wife's action
onfonm non con eniens grounds. Id. at 173-74, 240 S.E.2d at 401.
I1. Id. at 174-76, 240 S.E.2d at 402-03.
12. Id. at 174, 240 S.E.2d at 402. Petitioner's motions were heard and denied in Johnston
County District Court. Petitioner filed for a writ of certiorari in the court of appeals requesting
review of the order. Brief for Appellant at 3.
13. Brief for Appellant at 4.
14. The North Carolina Supreme Court ordered that petitioner's writ for discretionary re-
view under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (Cum. Supp. 1977) be allowed. Brief for Appellant at 4.
The court emphasized that it took the case not because the appellate court had abused its discre-
tion, but "because we desired to address the important and novel questions relating to the applica-
bility of the compulsory counterclaim provisions. . .for the guidance of the bench and bar." 294
N.C. at 173, 240 S.E.2d at 401.
15. 294 N.C. at 181, 240 S.E.2d at 406.
16. The wife had abandoned her reliance on the abatement theory. Id. at 175-76, 240 S.E.2d
at 402-03. Her husband, however, contended that the abatement theory and the prior case law
based on it were still good law. Id. at 175, 240 S.E.2d at 402; see Brief for Appellee at 4-12. While
the court hinted that abatement might still be a viable doctrine, its adoption of the compulsory
counterclaim procedures appears to negate the use of the doctrine in a Gardner context.
17. Relying on the premise that his wife's amendment should not relate back and thus her
action should be considered one for alimony without divorce, the husband argued that N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-16.8 (1969) made his claim merely permissive. Brief for Appellee at 7. The statute
provides in part: "The procedure in actions for alimony . . . shall be as in other civil actions
except as provided in this section." It also provides that actions for alimony may be filed as
counterclaims in divorce actions and actions for divorce may be filed as counterclaims in alimony
without divorce proceedings. The court, while failing throughout its opinion to distinguish be-
tween the wife's original and amended claim, pointed out that the statute was enacted in 1955 at a
1979] COMPULSORY CO UNTERCL,4IMS 441
compulsory in the plaintiff's suit. The court also held that when a
claim that is compulsory in a prior pending suit is filed separately, the
claim should be either stayed or dismissed with leave to file in the first
suit.18 Although the compulsory counterclaim rule does not specify this
result, 19 the court thought its holding necessary to promote the rule's
policies of avoiding wasteful litigation and inconsistent results.
The court further stated that if the second claim were filed after
final judgment in the first action, the claim would not be barred by the
compulsory counterclaim rule.2" It emphasized that this limitation was
consistent with a policy courts have strongly adhered to-that of main-
taining the marital ties. A spouse undesirous of pursuing a divorce is
not forced to do so by the institution of a related action by the other
spouse, yet remains free to change his mind later.2 '
Prior to North Carolina's adoption of the rules of civil procedure,
a there was no compulsory counterclaim rule.22 Rather, any claim aris-
ing out of the same transaction as the plaintiff's claim was permitted to
be filed either as a counterclaim2 3 or in a separate suit.24 When a claim
time when there was no compulsory counterclaim concept and counterclaims for alimony in ac-
tions for divorce were not allowed. Having placed the statute in its historical context, the court
reasoned it would not undermine the legislative intent to superimpose rule 13(a) on the statute and
make the counterclaim compulsory. 294 N.C. at 178, 240 S.E.2d at 404.
18. 294 N.C. at 177, 240 S.E.2d at 403 (citing 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1409, 1418 (1971)).
19. See note 6 supra. See also 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1418 (1971). The authors point out:
Although it is well established that a party is barred from suing on a claim that
should have been pleaded as a compulsory counterclaim in a prior action, one closely
related question remains unsettled. What would prevent a party who does not want to
assert his claim as a compulsory counterclaim in a suit instituted by his opponent from
bringing an independent action on that claim while the first action still is pending?
20. 294 N.C. at 181, 240 S.E.2d at 406. The court noted, however, that the doctrine of res
judicata may operate to bar a subsequent claim. Id. at 181 n.7, 240 S.E.2d at 406 n.7.
21. Id. at 181, 240 S.E.2d at 405-06. As one court noted, there is a paucity of case law on the
effect of the compulsory counterclaim provisions on divorce actions. Stolar v. Stolar, 359 A.2d
597, 598 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The Gardner court, in carving out this exception to the counterclaim
rule, relied on Moats v. Moats, 168 Colo. 120, 450 P.2d 64 (1969), which pointed out that without
the exception, the rule would interfere with substantive rights. Id. at 125, 450 P.2d at 66. Other
courts have reached differing conclusions on the effects of the rule. In Stolar, rule 13(a) was
applied to bar a claim for absolute divorce on the ground that the claim should have been filed as
a counterclaim in an earlier unsuccessful divorce suit filed by the other spouse. 359 A.2d at 599.
On the other hand, the Missouri Supreme Court has stated in dictum that notwithstanding the
compulsory counterclaim rule, a defendant still has a choice of asserting a divorce claim in a
separate suit. State ex rel. Fawkes v. Bland, 357 Mo. 634, 645, 210 S.W.2d 31, 36 (1948).
22. W. SHUFORD, NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 13-2 (1975).
23. Id. The former statutory provision relating to counterclaims, CODE OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE § 101 (1868) (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-137 (1953)) (repealed 1970), also
permitted as counterclaims all contract actions.
24. E.g., Union Trust v. McKinne, 179 N.C. 328, 102 S.E. 385 (1920).
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was filed separately during the pendency of a prior related action, the
doctrine of abatement was often invoked by the original plaintiff to
force dismissal of the second suit.25 Like the compulsory counterclaim
rule, the doctrine is designed to avoid multiple actions and inconsistent
results.26
The doctrine, however, has grave weaknesses. It is applied only
when both actions are filed in North Carolina. 7 Moreover, some
courts refuse to apply it in divorce actions, 8 producing wasteful litiga-
tion and confusion. Further, the doctrine requires dismissal of the sec-
ond divorce action only if the plaintiff in that action can obtain the
same relief by counterclaiming in the first and if his claim would be
defeated by a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the first suit.2 9 This
25. See, e.g., McDowell v. Blythe Bros., 236 N.C. 396, 72 S.E.2d 860 (1952). The conditions
for abating an action because of the pendency of a prior action are traditionally that the two be
substantially identical in parties, subject matter, issues involved, and relief demanded. Whitehurst
v. Hinton, 230 N.C. 16, 22, 51 S.E.2d 899, 903 (1949).
26. Reece v. Reece, 231 N.C. 321, 322, 56 S.E.2d 641, 642 (1949).
27. Historically, the doctrine of abatement has not required dismissal of an action filed in one
state while a related action is pending in another. See Cushing v. Cushing, 263 N.C. 181, 139
S.E.2d 217 (1964). Courts, however, have sometimes made discretionary determinations that the
second action should be stayed pending the outcome of the first. See Acorn v. Jones Knitting
Corp., 12 N.C. App. 266, 182 S.E.2d 862, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 511, 183 S.E.2d 686 (1971).
28. In Beeson v. Beeson, 246 N.C. 330, 98 S.E.2d 17 (1957), the court allowed an alimony
without divorce action filed subsequent to an absolute divorce action to proceed independently.
While the abatement doctrine was argued strenuously on appeal, Brief for Appellant at 4-7; Brief
for Appellee at 2-3, the court omitted any reference to it. Instead, it reasoned from a recent
statutory change that for the first time allowed a wife to counterclaim in her husband's divorce
action. 246 N.C. at 332, 98 S.E.2d at 18. This change, according to the court, gives a wife a choice
of asserting her claim in either a pending or a separate suit. Id.; see 36 N.C.L. REv. 203 (1958). In
Fullwood v. Fullwood, 270 N.C. 421, 154 S.E.2d 473 (1967), the Beeson fact situation was reversed
and both claims were again allowed to proceed independently. While mentioning in dictum the
abatement theory, the Fullwood court permitted the second action to proceed because the hus-
band's claim for absolute divorce based on the statutory separation period had not accrued in time
for him to assert it in his wife's prior suit. Id. at 423, 154 S.E.2d at 475. Although the Fullwood
result would appear to be the same after Gardner, see note 45 and accompanying text infra, the
vitality of Beeson is less certain. The Gardner court's superimposition of the compulsory counter-
claim provision on the statute that allows counterclaims for alimony in divorce suits (and counter-
claims for divorce in alimony suits), see note 17 supra, appears to change the Beeson result. This
conclusion is complicated, however, because the statute specifically allows the alimony claim to be
filed either separately or as a cross action, while it states merely that cross actions for divorce
"shall be allowable" in alimony suits. Since the Gardner opinion, which dealt with the latter
situation, concentrated on the entire statute in holding the former filing option mandatory, it is
likely that the section allowing alimony claims to be filed separately will be held only to cover
situations in which there is no previously filed divorce claim. If so, then Beeson is no longer
controlling.
29. The requirements for abatement in the divorce context were enunciated most clearly in
Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796 (1952). The court held that the ordinary test for
determining whether an action should be abated is not applicable when "the parties to the prior
action appear in the subsequent action in reverse order, and the plaintiff in the second action, as
defendant in the first, has failed to plead a counterclaim or cross demand for the same cause of
action." Id. at 85, 68 S.E.2d at 798. In such a case, the law devises a special test. Id. at 86, 68
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test, based on principles of res judicata,30 is so restrictive that the sec-
ond action has rarely been dismissed.'
The Gardner decision has done away with the confusing proce-
dures and wasteful results dictated by prior case law. The abatement
approach, with its emphasis on whether res judicata would necessarily
bar a subsequent claim, is now replaced by a simpler approach that
focuses on the common factual bases of the related claims. Because
application of the abatement doctrine is so laden with rules and excep-
tions that related claims are often permitted to proceed indepen-
dently,3" the new approach is an important step in the direction of
S.E.2d at 799. The fact situation the Cameron court was referring to was and is obviously a
pattern common to divorce actions.
30. The term "res judicata" is used to encompass the doctrines of bar, merger and collateral
estoppel. See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 532 (2d ed. 1977).
31. The adverse effects of the special application of the abatement theory in the divorce con-
text were illustrated in Cook v. Cook, 159 N.C. 46, 74 S.E. 639 (1912), in which a husband filed an
action for divorce based on a 10 year separation period and his wife subsequently initiated a
separate suit for a limited divorce on the ground of abandonment. A divided court allowed the
wife's action to proceed, reasoning that to force her to bring her claim in the prior action would be
particularly inappropriate in a marital context "where a party may not desire to presently seek
affirmative relief, in the hope that a different course would more likely lead to a reconciliation."
Id. at 50, 74 S.E. at 641. Further, since the substantive law at the time allowed an absolute
divorce based on the statutory separation period irrespective of fault, the court concluded that the
issues to be determined in the husband's action would not be the same as those in the wife's
abandonment claim and thus doctrines of former adjudication would pose no bar to her action.
The dissent recognized the need to adjudicate divorce actions in one proceeding and the practical
problems inherent in the majority's result. It pointed out the obvious: had the husband been
granted an absolute divorce prior to the entry of judgment in the wife's action, her claim for
divorce, absolute or limited and regardless of the grounds, would have necessarily been barred.
Id. at 52, 74 S.E. at 642 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
In McLeod v. McLeod, I N.C. App. 396, 161 S.E.2d 635 (1968), the court held that an ali-
mony without divorce action would not abate a subsequently filed claim for absolute divorce
because a judgment on the merits in the first action would not bar the second. Id. at 398, 161
S.E.2d at 636. While technically this was true, MfcLeod demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the
Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 769 (1952), test in protecting against needless litiga-
tion time and expense. See note 29 supra.
The other prong of the Cameron text-that the plaintiff in the second action be able to obtain
the same relief in the first--coupled with peculiar laws governing alimony, also produced unnec-
essary litigation. Until 1967, a dependent spouse could not secure alimony and an absolute di-
vorce at the same time. 2 R. LEE, supra note 4, § 135. Her only means of preserving alimony was
by first initiating an action for alimony and later an action for divorce. A prior alimony decree
would survive a divorce judgment granted either spouse. Id. § 135, at 51-55 (1963). Because
before 1955 a wife could only file an alimony action in a separate proceeding, it followed that,
under the abatement test, a wife's action for alimony without divorce could proceed independently
of her husband's prior divorce suit. Reece v. Reece, 231 N.C. 321, 322-23, 56 S.E.2d 641, 642-43
(1949).
32. For example, the doctrine of collateral estoppel operates to make conclusive a prior de-
termination of an issue of fact in a subsequent proceeding if the issue was actually litigated in the
first action. Some courts require the common issue to have been an essential element or ultimate
fact in both actions, King v. Chase, 15 N.H. 9 (1844); others apply the doctrine to an evidentiary
fact in the first or second if certain factors exist, The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.
1944).
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effective use of court time. Furthermore, by creating a narrow excep-
tion when the second claim is filed after judgment in the first, the court
demonstrated it will not allow procedural policies to interfere with the
substantive policy of maintaining the marital bonds.33
The Gardner opinion, however, leaves room for disregard of these
procedural aims in allowing judges an apparently unrestricted option
to stay, as well as dismiss, a separately filed claim that is a compulsory
counterclaim in a prior pending suit. Under the prior procedure, the
abatement doctrine was applied to require dismissal of the second ac-
tion as a matter of law.34 By appearing to permit in all circumstances
the alternative of a stay, the court is sanctioning a second suit after
judgment in the first, which would defeat the efficiency goals of the
compulsory counterclaim rule.35 The emphasis throughout Gardner on
avoiding wasteful litigation and circuity of action, however, suggests
that it may be necessary to confine those situations in which a stay
might be appropriate.
The Gardner court, unfortunately, failed to provide any standards.
In giving courts the options of stay and dismissal, it cited various fed-
eral court decisions, some of which have stayed and others of which
have dismissed the compulsory counterclaim filed as a separate suit.36
These courts, in general, also provide little guidance concerning when a
stay might be appropriate.
One justification for granting a stay of the second action could be
to protect the second plaintiff's choice of forum. Although courts rarely
33. For a discussion of treatment of this issue by other state courts, see note 21 supra. In
certain statutory areas, the federal courts have found substantive policies to outweigh the procedu-
ral policies behind rule 13(a). See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 19, § 1412. For exam-
ple, in Local 11, Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers v. G.P. Thompson Elec., Inc., 363 F.2d 181 (9th Cir.
1966), the court refused to require grievances pending in arbitration to be pleaded as compulsory
counterclaims in actions brought on grievances outside the scope of arbitration because to do so
would be contrary to a national labor policy that encourages arbitration. Id. at 185.
34. W.S. Boyd Sales Co. v. Seymour, 255 N.C. 714, 122 S.E.2d 605 (1961).
35. A total eclipse of the rule's goals would be avoided because a stay would still eliminate
the races to judgment that existed in the past. Moreover, collateral estoppel will preclude litiga-
tion in the second suit of issues actually decided in the first. Furthermore, res judicata could, it
seems, operate to foreclose many of these second suits since it precludes a suit between the same
parties on a claim that has been previously litigated between them. Yet, because the compulsory
counterclaim and resjudicata doctrines serve many of the same policies, it may be inconsistent to
allow a compulsory counterclaim to be stayed and then to say later that resjudicata requires it to
be barred.
36. 294 N.C. at 177, 240 S.E.2d at 403.
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give forum protection much consideration,37 federal courts have in gen-
eral been more sympathetic to the idea when it appears that forum
shopping alone motivated the original plaintiffs forum choice. 8 In-
deed, forum protection may often justify a stay in a divorce controversy
because the substantive law governing divorce claims enables one
spouse easily to thwart the other's choice of forum. A typical scenario
follows: The wife's claim for alimony without divorce or for limited
divorce on the ground of abandonment arises as soon as the husband
leaves home; the husband, however, must wait until the one-year sepa-
ration period expires before his absolute divorce claim accrues. By a
timely filing of her claims so that her spouse's claim accrues prior to his
deadline for answering, the wife can force her husband's compulsory
counterclaim39 and defeat his forum choice. The husband, to protect
his forum preference, must ask for transfer of venue in his wife's action
and/or, according to Gardner, file his claim independently and petition
for a stay. A stay pending the outcome of the wife's action may there-
fore be justified to protect the husband's forum preference.
A stay would be particularly well justified when there is additional
evidence that "forum thwarting" motivated the choice of situs in the
first suit as, for example, when the wife files suit in one jurisdiction the
day after she moves there from another jurisdiction in which she and
her husband have lived for many years.40 Indeed, there may be other
special reasons for staying the second action. Absent undue prejudice,
however, the ease with which litigants can travel between courts within
the same state coupled with the advantages of consolidating litigation
should be weighed heavily in determining the limits of Gardner's li-
cense to stay claims that are compulsory counterclaims in prior pending
suits.
The application of the counterclaim rule to circumstances different
from Gardner is uncertain. In Gardner, because both claims were
based on the separation that occurred when the husband left home,4'
37. Judicial protocol requires that when two courts of competent jurisdiction entertain re-
lated actions, the court in which the first action was brought should be given priority. McDowell
v. Blythe Bros., 236 N.C. 396, 72 S.E.2d 860 (1952).
38. See Mattel, Inc. v. Louis Marx & Co., 353 F.2d 421, 424 n.4 (2d Cir. 1965); Leonard F.
Feilman Co. v. Smith-Corona Marchant Inc., 27 F.R.D. 263 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
39. The husband's counterclaim will not be forced, of course, if he avails himself of the coun-
terclaim exception and files suit only after judgment on his wife's claim. Clearly, however, in
many circumstances central issues in the second suit will be precluded by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.
40. The situation in Gardner was a good example of this problem of "forum thwarting." See
note 10 supra.
41. 294 N.C. at 176, 240 S.E.2d at 403.
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they were characterized as arising out of the "same transaction or oc-
currence" and thus deemed compulsory. However, a divorce claim
based on adultery, for example, may not be held to arise out of the
same factual circumstances as one based on mental cruelty.42 Another
requirement of a compulsory counterclaim is that it be a claim "which
at the time of serving the pleading, the pleader has against any oppos-
ing party."43 While in Gardner the husband's claim for divorce arose
before the time he was required to answer in his wife's suit,' this defi-
nition requires that when the claim arises afterwards, both actions may
proceed independently.45
The scope of the counterclaim exception created by the court for
circumstances in which the second claim is filed after judgment in the
first also remains uncertain. In Gardner, the husband's claim was for a
complete divorce.46 Had he filed it after judgment in his wife's action,
the court said, the compulsory counterclaim rule would not bar its
prosecution because of the policy of protecting the marital bonds.47 If
the court's reasoning is carried further, counterclaims for alimony with-
out divorce or for any remedy less than a complete severance of the
marital ties could be barred if not asserted in the first action, because
requiring their assertion if available may not be held to offend the pol-
icy that led the court to limit its holding.48 Nevertheless, a counter-
claim for a limited divorce may prove sufficiently offensive to the
policy favoring marriage to trigger the exception.
Finally, the employment of Gardner's counterclaim rule when one
of the two actions is filed outside North Carolina is also unclear. It
seems certain that when the North Carolina action is filed last, North
Carolina courts no longer have the discretion to continue proceeding as
42. The issue of the compulsory nature of the claim may be largely academic because a
number of grounds are normally stated in a divorce claim, one of which is abandonment. In fact,
in Gardner, abandonment was one of numerous grounds, id. at 174, 240 S.E.2d at 401, yet the
court focused solely on abandonment in holding that both claims were part of the same occur-
rence, id. at 176, 240 S.E.2d at 403.
43. N.C.R. Civ. P. 13(a), quoted in note 6 supra.
44. See note 9 supra.
45. The same result was reached in Fullwood v. Fullwood, 270 N.C. 421, 154 S.E.2d 473
(1967), discussed in note 28 supra, prior to the enactment of the rules of procedure. Of course, as
has been pointed out, a wife could avoid this situation by a timely filing of her claim.
46. 294 N.C. at 173, 240 S.E.2d at 402.
47. Id. at 181, 240 S.E.2d at 406.
48. A recent statutory change, however, requires a court to ensure that all support and ali-
mony claims, if existent, have been adjudicated before it grants an absolute divorce based on the
statutory separation period. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (Supp. 1977).
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they did under the abatement doctrine,49 but are required either to dis-
miss or to stay the claim." What other jurisdictions will do when they
entertain the second action remains to be seen. A refusal to dismiss or
stay the second claim when it is a compulsory counterclaim in the
North Carolina suit is arguably a violation of the Constitution's full
faith and credit clause,51 which requires states to honor the public acts
and judicial proceedings of other states absent a strong state policy dic-
tating otherwise. 2 The compulsory counterclaim rule in general has,
however, met with problems in interstate actions,5 3 with states invoking
this exception and refusing to honor the rules of other states on the
ground that they are protecting their own citizens.54 Until the United
States Supreme Court rules on the status of compulsory counterclaims
in interstate actions, races to judgment will continue when similar ac-
tions are filed in separate states.
The Gardner result was a logical implementation of the policy un-
derlying the rules of procedure of avoiding wasteful litigation and in-
consistent results. The new practice that the court prescribed is a
needed amendment of the old, but the court did not go far enough in
effectuating the rules' aims. Instead, it left the question whether to stay
or dismiss the second claim wholly to the discretion of trial judges, per-
mitting possible frustration of the rules' intent. Many other questions,
though not squarely presented in Gardner, are also certain to
arise--questions such as the appropriate solution in interstate actions,
the compulsory nature of a claim for less than a complete divorce, and
the reach of the "transaction or occurrence" test. The courts must now
49. See note 27 supra.
50. There is nothing in Gardner to suggest that the compulsory counterclaim rule does not
cross state lines. However, because the court did note that the substantive law governing abate-
ment is not necessarily abrogated, 294 N.C. at 175 n.5, 240 S.E.2d at 402 n.5, it is possible that
courts will continue to use the old procedure.
51. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
52. This clause "does not automatically compel a forum state to subordinate its own statutory
policy to a conflicting public act of another state; rather, it is for this Court to choose in each case
between the competing public policies involved." Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611 (1951).
53. See Kennedy, Counterclaims Under Federal Rule 13, 11 Hous. L. REv. 255, 280-83
(1974).
54. Of course a foreign court in a Gardner situation could also contend that giving effect to
North Carolina's compulsory counterclaim rule deprives its citizens of substantive rights because
the substdntive divorce law of North Carolina does not afford them much protection. See Vestal,
Reactive Litigation, 47 IowA L. REV. 1I, 20-21, 24 (1961).
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pick up where Gardner left off and resolve these issues consistent with
the purpose of the compulsory counterclaim rule.
HARRIET S. SUGAR
Criminal Law-State v. Looney: Defendants' Need for Court-
Ordered Psychiatric Evaluations of Witnesses' Credibility
Outweighed by Witnesses' Right to Privacy
A growing number of states have held that in criminal trials judges
have the discretion to order a psychiatric examination of a key prosecu-
tion witness when there is evidence the examination may disclose an
abnormal mental condition bearing on credibility.' In a case of first
impression, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v.
Looney2 refused to join this growing body of jurisdictions recognizing
such discretion in the trial court. Without expressly deciding whether
the trial judge lacked the inherent authority to order a witness to sub-
mit to a psychiatric exam, the supreme court strongly suggested that
under present North Carolina criminal procedure the trial judge should
not order such an examination of a witness in the absence of specific
statutory guidelines provided by the North Carolina legislature.3 The
Looney court then concluded that, even if the trial court could properly
have granted defendant's motion for a court-ordered exam, denial of
the motion under the circumstances of the Looney case was not an
abuse of discretion.4
On December 30, 1974, the mutilated body of defendant Looney's
wife was discovered in the Looney home.5 Subsequent investigation of
1. For a recent case evidencing the trend toward sanctioning court-ordered psychiatric ex-
ams, see Forbes v. State, 559 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tenn. 1977). For a collection of cases on the
subject, see Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1433 (1968). Federal courts trying criminal cases also have the
authority to order a government witness to submit to a psychiatric examination in order to probe
the witness' credibility. See, e.g., United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
2. 294 N.C. 1, 240 S.E.2d 612 (1978).
3. Id. at 28, 240 S.E.2d at 627.
4. Id.
5. Record at 22. The police officials involved in the case and the pathologist who performed
an autopsy on the body later testified under cross-examination that the case was the most, or one
of the most, brutal homicides they had encountered. Id. at 22, 25, 31, 34. The decedent received
several blows and stabs that independently would have been fatal. Id. at 34. The body showed
evidence of more than 60 severe wounds. Id. at 32. In support of his motion for a psychiatric
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